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Professor Lawrence 0. Gostin has long been one of the leading figures
in public health law. An amazingly prolific and assiduous scholar, he has
written on almost every aspect of public health law, both domestic and
international, and in so doing, has brought needed attention and light to the
once moribund field. Given his many notable contributions to the subject,
it is not surprising that his Dunwody lecture situates the debate about legal
responses to bioterrorism in the context of one of the field's overarching
issues: the relationship between individuals and the state. Nor is it
surprising that he has chosen to tackle the issue by examining what leading
moral theories would say about restrictions on individual liberty taken in
the name of public health. This is an important contribution that moves the
debate about bioterrorism and public health into the wider realm of
political and ethical discourse.
In this brief Commentary, I can scarcely do justice to all of Gostin's
analyses and observations. I do hope, however, to continue the dialogue he
has started by looking a bit further at his claim that leading ethical theories
would support the type of limitations on individual rights that are proffered
by the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).' More
specifically, while I accept Gostin's conclusion that both liberals and
communitarians will agree that some limitations on individual liberty are
justified in the name of the public, I want to explore some distinctions

* Matthews University Distinguished Professor of Law, Northeastern University. Many
thanks to Richard A. Daynard and Patricia Illingworth for their comments on an earlier draft. Scott
Dildine, Samuel Leadholm, Melissa Brennan, Heather Engman and Jason Smith provided
outstanding research assistance. Jan McNew, as always, provided wonderful secretarial assistance.
All errors and oversights are my own.
1. Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far are Limitations on
Personal and Economic Liberties Justified, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2003); see CTR. FOR LAW
AND THE PUBliC'S HEALTH, GEORGETOWN UNIV. & JOHNs HOPKiNs UNIV., THE MODEL STATE

EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Dec. 21, 2001), at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf [hereinafter MSEHPA].
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within and between each of these broad movements that may raise
additional questions about legal responses to public health. In addition, I
want to ask whether public health itself has any insights or perspectives
that can add to our discussion of the moral and policy questions posed by
bioterrorism.2 In the conclusion, I argue that it does, and suggest some of
the ways that public health, understood as a perspective, can help us view
the questions that Gostin has raised for us.
I. STARTING POINTS

There can be little doubt that the preservation of public health often
requires the imposition of laws and policies which limit the freedom of
some individuals and firms. In his Dunwody lecture, Gostin focuses on the
threats posed by bioterrorism, but a similar assertion can be made about
other threats to public health. For example, it seems beyond dispute that
in the wake of the recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak, governments were justified in examining the health of
passengers traveling from SARS-affected areas.3 Indeed, the MSEHPA
that Gostin helped draft does not limit the application of emergency
powers to incidents of bioterrorism.4
Although infectious diseases pose the most glaring example of health
threats that may warrant limits on individual freedoms, they do not exhaust
the list of candidates. Few would question the appropriateness of laws
prohibiting the dumping of raw sewage in a city's water supply or driving
seventy-five miles per hour in a school zone. Indeed, to some degree, it is
simply obvious, and even banal, to note that as individuals living in
society, and not as hermits on a deserted isle, our putative freedoms (and
I use the word "putative" pointedly, because one may question whether
there can be freedom or a right to act in such a manner) may and must be
limited to ensure that we do not harm others. That, I think, is the
fundamental lesson not only of Jacobson v. Massachusetts,5 but also of
kindergarten.6
The question for public health law and ethics, however, is what
balances should be struck and what policies should be adopted once we put
the obvious, trivial examples aside. To what degree does the good of a
population justify limiting the actions or inactions of some individuals?
Are we justified in requiring a child to have a Diphtheria, Pertussis,
2. Gostin, supra note 1.
3. See World Health Organization, Summary of WHO Measures Related to International
Travel (June 23, 2003), at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/travelupdate/en/.
4. MSEHPA, supra note I, § 104(m).
5. 197 U.S. II, 26, 29 (1905).
6. See ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED INKINDERGARTEN:
UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON THINGS 6-8 (1989).
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Tetanus (DPT) vaccine? In prohibiting a firm from putting particulates in
the air? Should states be empowered to quarantine individuals who might
or might not have a communicable disease?
To some extent, the answer to all of these questions must depend, as
Gostin notes,7 and as I will stress later, on empirical determinations about
the degree of risk to others, the efficacy of the proposed restraint on
freedom, and perhaps, the ability of individuals to protect themselves from
the perceived harm.' But the answer must also depend on some normative
assumptions about the proper relationship between individuals and their
communities, the value given to health, and the role of the state.
Recognizing the importance of these questions, Gostin provides us with a
helpful framework for analyzing specific cases, astutely turning to
normative theory to defend his contention about where and how the lines
should be drawn.9

A. Liberalism
Gostin commences his normative analysis with a discussion of
liberalism, which he rightly sees as the "de facto political philosophy" of
contemporary America. 0 Liberalism, as he notes, is marked by its respect
for individuals and their moral agency." Thus, liberals care a lot about
individual liberty and accept that individuals are rational actors with
preferences and interests that reside apart from their community. 2
That said, liberalism is a broad umbrella, which encompasses not only
George W. Bush (though I doubt he would use the "L" word) and Ralph
Nader, but also Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Ronald Dworkin and
John Rawls, as well as innumerable other theorists. 3 As Gostin

7. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1135.
8. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE "OLD" PUBLIC HEALTH: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH 27 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working

Paper No. 170, 2d ser. 2002) (arguing that the availability of self-help measures undercuts the
legitimacy of coercive measures imposed by the state), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html.
9. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1141-58.
10. Id. at 1141.
11. Id. at 1141-42.
12. ELIZABETH FRAZER, THE PROBLEMS OF COMMUNITARIAN POLmCS: UNrrY AND
CONFLICT 16-18 (1999). This is not to say that all liberals believe that individual preferences are
unaffected or uninfluenced by communities. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 64-66 (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22-28 (1993).

The point I make here is merely that liberals, for the most part, can understand and conceptualize
individual preferences and interests as distinct from the interests and values of their communities.
13. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-13 (2d ed. 1998).
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understands, 4 it is always somewhat dangerous to make assertions about
liberalism qua liberalism as if it were a singular, unified theory.
Gostin responds by focusing on the distinctions between so-called civil
libertarians, who cherish freedom of personal action, 5 and economic
libertarians, who stress freedom of enterprise. 6 According to Gostin,
despite their differences, both of these types of liberals would ultimately
agree with his framework for invoking liberty-limiting laws in the face of
bioterrorism. 7 Both civil and economic libertarians, he claims, would
frown upon the use of such laws when the threat is low and the law is
poorly targeted; both would accept such measures when the threat is
significant and the law is well targeted; and both would say "it depends
upon the facts" when the threat is moderate and the law cannot be finely
tuned. 8
Ah, but as Richard Epstein, the scholar upon whom Gostin relies as his
exemplar of economic libertarianism, states, "[tihe devil ... lies in the
details."' 9 No liberal, nor any other serious thinker for that matter, would
support significantly repressive measures for no good reason. Nor would
any serious theorist deny that states can take actions to prevent clear and
obvious dangers to many of their citizens. The debate about bioterrorism
planning in particular, and public health law in general, is all about the
hard cases-when the risks are uncertain, the efficacy of policies unclear,
and the uncertainties manifest.
As we think about this murky gray zone, the disagreements and
nuances within the liberal tradition that Gostin leaves unexplored may
warrant additional consideration. Most relevant may be the distinctions
between consequentialists, who judge the morality of an action by its
effects, and deonotological theorists, who judge an action's moral
character by its nature. 20 Among consequentialist thinkers, the most
are utilitarians, who focus on the action's impact on aggregate
important
2
utility. '
At first blush, utilitarians would appear to provide Gostin with his
strongest brief. They, after all, evaluate an action (mandatory quarantine,
for instance) by its impact on the many. And it is Gostin's argument that

14. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1142-43.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1145.

18. Id. at 1152-54, 1158.
19. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 22.
20. PATR CI IUINGWORTH & WENDY E. PARMET, ETHICAL HEALTH CARE (forthcoming
2004) (manuscript at 1-21, on file with authors).
21. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTITARIANISM 76 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)

(1863).
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bioterrorism presents such a grave threat to the many that, at times,
individual interests must be rejected.22
Gostin, however, does not purport to rely on utilitarianism to support
his claim that liberals would endorse his views. Indeed, he treats
utilitarianism as if it were outside the tent of liberalism, claiming that
"liberalism is ...a rejoinder to utilitarianism."23 That is surprising both
because the classical liberal tradition predates the birth of utilitarianism
(John Locke wrote almost one hundred years before Jeremy Bentham),24
and because many proponents of what Gostin calls economic
libertarianism (which he treats as a form of liberalism) are undoubtedly
utilitarians.25
Regardless of the labels applied, Gostin appears to rely upon an
essentially utilitarian argument to support his claim that liberals would
endorse limitations on liberty in the face of bioterrorism: to wit, restraints
against individual freedoms are justified by the magnitude of the risk of
bioterrorism from which individuals cannot protect themselves.26
Undoubtedly, given the right set of facts and a great enough risk to enough
people, many utilitarians will concur. Nevertheless, they may raise some
questions about Gostin's premises and specific conclusions. Most
importantly, in constructing his argument, Gostin implicitly assumes that
public health protection is undoubtedly a more highly valued good than
liberty. 27 Yet, utilitarians are liberals precisely because they assert the
individual's capacity to choose and the subjective nature of preferences.28
22. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1160. Utilitarianism, of course, has many critics, as do all of the
theories discussed below. For the purposes of this Commentary, I shall leave those criticisms,
however insightful, aside and focus only on the theories themselves and the points they may raise
about limiting individual liberty in the name of public health.
23. Id. at 1141. To be sure, Gostin does note and cite Mill for the proposition that not all
liberals reject utilitarianism. Id. n. 195.

24. John Locke first published his Two Treatises of Government in 1690. See Thomas I.
Cook, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ix (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947) (1690). Jeremy Bentham, set forth the "principle of utility" in the
Principlesof Morals and Legislation which was first published in 1789. See JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart

eds., Clarendon Press 1970) (1789). It is difficult, therefore, to see how liberalism, which Locke
certainly espoused, served as a rejoinder to utilitarianism.
25. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-15 (1992); Martha C.
Nussbaum, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward: Flawed Foundations: The
PhilosophicalCritique of(a ParticularType ofi Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1206 (1997)
(noting that proponents of law and economics are generally utilitarians, although there are
inconsistencies between their utilitarian and libertarian beliefs).
26. Gostin, supra note I, at 1160-61.
27. As I shall argue later, public health itself makes a somewhat similar assumption, that
public health is an undeniable good. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
28. E.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductionto the PrinciplesofMorals andLegislation, in
A BENTHAM READER 73, 86-87 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969); FRAZER, supra note 12, at 17-18.
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To utilitarians, the good is determined by aggregating individual
preferences, which is difficult if there is no common metric with which to
compare them.29 And individuals may or may not value health as their
highest goal. Some people after all prefer risky endeavors; some would
choose the "right to die,"30 and others would shout "live free or die."'" To
a utilitarian, we simply cannot know or assert a priori what ranking
individuals would give to various goods and what therefore would
constitute the aggregate good.
So-called economic libertarians, or those who apply the teachings and
perspectives of neo-classical economics to law, attempt to avoid the
incommensurability problem by using a common metric (dollars) and
substituting wealth (or efficiency) for utility.32 But they, too, generally
reject the notion that government, or anyone, can know a priori how
individuals value different goods and risks and therefore what constitutes
the public good.33 Indeed, it is precisely because they note that different
people place different values on different goods and risks that economists
tend to favor market-oriented transactions in which welfare is maximized
by aggregating individual transactions. To be sure, market theorists
understand that markets have imperfections and that there is a role for
governments to play in protecting public health when markets cannot be
trusted. Thus, Epstein sees a role for government in providing information
for individuals and, at times, he would support quarantining to prevent the
spread of communicable diseases.34 Nevertheless, market theorists remain
deeply skeptical of the view that we can assume a priori that avoiding ill

29. For a discussion of the impact of this problem on the progressive potential of utilitarism,
see Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism andthe SeparationofLaw and
Economics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 805, 844 (2000).
30. The recognition in American law of a limited "right to die" reflects the liberal respect for
autonomy and the liberal belief that not all individuals would value life or health over other goods,
such as dignity or independence. See, e.g., Tania Salem, Physician-AssistedSuicide: Promoting
Autonomy-or MedicalizingSuicide?, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (1999).
31. And some would refuse to do so. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)
(upholding the right of an individual to cover the "live free or die" state motto on automobile
license plate).
32. Nussbaum, supranote 25, at 1206-07. It should be noted that some economic libertarians,
such as Epstein, may also support a natural law view of property rights. See Richard A. Epstein,
The UtilitarianFoundationsofNaturalLaw, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 713,718 (1989) (arguing
that utilitarianism can provide support for the conclusions of natural law thinkers).
33. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supranote 8, at 43; see also Richard Craswell, Passingon the Costs
of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distributionin Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361,
368-69 (1991); Lewis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
1041 n.153, 1052 n.180 (2001); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against
Individual Liberty: The Ethics ofSmoking Regulations,61 U. PIr. L. REV. 419,426 & n.22 (2000)
(citing authorities for the proposition that individuals place different values on their health).
34. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 20-22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss5/4

6

Parmet: Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health: Comments on Lawr
DUNWODYCONMENTARY

health is the highest goal.35 They usually seek to confine government
action in the name of public health as narrowly as possible. Thus,
economic libertarians may well reject the idea that government should
have the power to forcibly vaccinate people for smallpox in the event of
a terrorist attack when individuals could opt to self-insure against the
attack by being vaccinated prior to any incident (ifonly government would
allow that market to work).
Rule utilitarians may also question (but possibly support) the
framework that Gostin has given us. Rule utilitarians focus less on the
consequences of individual actions and more on the consequences of
generalizeable rules of conduct.36 One can imagine a rule utilitarian
supporting the framework for analysis that Gostin has provided by
envisioning it as the best "rule" for maximizing overall utility. On the
other hand, one can well imagine an argument positing that his framework
makes it all too easy for government to err on the side of restricting liberty,
and that the overall consequences of authorizing the type of abridgment of
liberty permitted by the MSEHPA may be greater than the risks of
bioterrorism prevented by this type of law.
This possible argument points to the fact that for the utilitarian we need
to consider all of the aggregate costs and benefits. We cannot simply
weigh the costs to an individual of a restriction on liberty against the
benefits to the population at large of preventing the spread of a bioterrorist
agent. The calculus that compares one person's quarantine versus a plague
caused by bioterrorism is too easy and too inaccurate. To satisfy the
utilitarian, we would need to know the costs imposed on all people and
society by enacting laws that give governments more coercive power and
might divert resources from other health efforts. We would also have to
compare the aggregate cost to individuals and society with the marginal
benefit that would be derived from enacting coercive measures (how many
lives would be saved if we used coercive rather than voluntary measures
when a catastrophe strikes). The calculus thus would put social interests
on both sides of the scale. So framed, it becomes harder to know whether
restrictive legal measures actually would create more benefit than harm.
If some utilitarians may question the conclusions Gostin reaches,
deontological theorists may have even greater qualms. While again there
is no single definitive school of deontological thought,37 this tradition
stresses the nature of actions and often contends that there are certain core

35. See Donald P. Judges, OfRocks and HardPlaces: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY
L.J. 1, 3-11 (1993) (arguing for the subjective value of risk-taking).
36. ILLINGWORTH & PARMET, supra note 20; MILL, supra note 12, at 21.
37. The tradition, at least in its modem incarnation, can be traced to Immanuel Kant. Ronald
Dworkin, Robert Nozick and even John Rawls employ aspects of deontological reasoning. See
FRAZER, supra note 12, at 15-16.
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"rights" which ought not be abridged. In arguing that such theorists will
accept limitations on private or economic actions in the name of public
health, Gostin correctly notes that few (if any) rights theorists would claim
that individuals have the right to harm another.3" True. But while rights
theorists generally admit that individuals have no right to intentionally
undertake actions to endanger others (because rights of autonomy do not
go that far), in contrast to utilitarians such as Peter Singer,39 many rights
theorists hold that an individual can refrain from taking actions to prevent
injury to another.40 Or, to put it another way, deontologists believe that
society has no right to require an individual to be a Good Samaritan. This
"no duty" rule is well ensconced in our law,4 ' and is the source of some of
the chief complaints that communitarians wage against liberalism.42 It also
has been enormously influential in the development of contemporary
bioethics. Thus, the Nuremberg Declaration posits that each individual has
the absolute right to determine whether or not he or she will participate in
clinical research.43 The fact that the individual's failure to consent to
participate may undermine public health and lead to harm to others is no
answer to a strong rights theorist. Likewise, the fact that a woman's refusal
to consent to surgery may endanger the life of her fetus does not justify,
to most supporters of human rights, the view that the woman can be
compelled to have the surgery.44
For rights theorists, therefore, the question about whether individual
rights can be restricted in the name of public health is a very difficult one,
depending not only on the magnitude of the threat and the fine-tuned
nature of the law, as Gostin would contend, but also on subtle, or even
murky, distinctions between action and inaction and baseline conceptions
of rights.45 From this perspective, governments may take some steps to
protect the public good, but they do not have the right to sacrifice some
individuals (or their property) for the good of others. As a result, under this
38. Gostin, supra note I, at 1145-47.
39. See Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence and Morality, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: AN
ANTHoLOGY 585, 585-93 (Hugh LeFollette ed., 1997).
40. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Some BriefThoughts (MostlyNegative) About 'BadSamaritan'
Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 975 (2000); Nancy K. Rhoden, Cesareansand Samaritans,
15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118, 118-25 (1987).
41. For examples of jurisdictions applying the rule, see 62 AM. JUR. 2D PremisesLiability
§ 150 (2003).
42. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 93-95 (1991).
43. NUREMBERG MILTARY TRIBUNALS, NUREMBERG CODE: DIRECTIVES FOR HUMAN

EXPERIMENTATION (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/nuremberg.php3.
44. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990).
45. The insubstantiality of these distinctions has been one of the most noted problems with
rights theory by its critics. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 2271, 2278-85 (1990).
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tradition, we need to worry about whether a law requiring an individual to
be examined or vaccinated without consent constitutes a valid limitation
on an action by the individual that is harmful to others, or an inappropriate
demand that the individual act against her will for the good of another.
Likewise, we may wonder whether an individual who is subject to a
quarantine can be viewed either as one posing an impermissible danger to
others, or as an innocent victim whose liberty is being sacrificed for the
benefit of others.
Importantly, the brands of liberalism discussed by Gostin do not
exhaust the range. One surprising omission from the lecture is egalitarian
and social contractarian visions of liberalism, like those espoused by John
Rawls.46 Rawls, of course, analyzes questions of justice by reference to
what members of a polity would decide were they deciding behind a veil
of ignorance, where their own particular life situations would not be
known to them.4 7 According to Rawls, individuals in this situation would
agree upon a "difference principle," which measures actions taken against
its effect upon the worst off in society.4 This principle may offer a
particularly important guidepost for bioterrorism laws, which could well
lead to more harm for the most vulnerable. The MSEHPA, for example,
permits the most stringent actions to be taken against those individuals
who have faced the misfortune of contracting a potentially deadly
disease.49 And, the MSEHPA quarantine and isolation provisions may well
have a particularly harsh impact on individuals who are dependent on
others, homeless, or lack single family houses where they can be isolated
at home. Certainly the history of coercive public health measures should
give us reason to worry about their potential for disproportionately
harming the worst off.5" Thus, a Rawlsian perspective may caution us to
recall the difference principle in any framework devised for responding to
bioterrorism.
None of this is to say that liberals would or should necessarily reject
either the framework Gostin sets forth in the lecture or the MSEHPA.5 '
Rather, I merely wish to suggest that liberalism is a complex and varied set

46.

JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE I

(1971). Rawls may also be classified as a rights

theorist. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. RAWLS, supra note 46, at 11-12.
48. Id. at 65-70.
49. MSEHPA, supra note 1, §§ 601-606.
50. See Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health and Law: PastandFuture Visions, 28 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 525, 543-47 (2003) (reviewing LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PuBLIc HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2001)); Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an
Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 66-71 (1985).
51. It is possible that this framework provides for less extensive intrusions on liberty than the
MSEHPA. However, precisely because this framework is presented with a fair degree of generality
and lacks the legal language and detail found in the MSEHPA, it is difficult to compare the two.
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of theories and perspectives. These different perspectives are worth
exploring, as they may provide us with important cautions as we develop
and critique laws aimed at preparing us for bioterrorism.
B. Communitarianism
In his lecture, Gostin claims, quite rightly, that "[s]upport for public
health and security comes more naturally to a communitarian than to a
liberal. ' 52 This is because, as Gostin notes, communitarianism is a
philosophy that situates individuals within their communities and
understands their interests as existing in a relationship with those
communities.
As Gostin explains, many communitarians stress the importance of
health, especially public health. 5' They also denigrate the importance given
to individual rights and autonomy by liberals.54 Thus communitarians may
be less inclined than liberals to be alarmed by the deprivations of
individual freedom in the name of public health. Indeed, a recent article in
the Responsive Community, an avowedly communitarian journal, argues
in support of the MSEHPA on the basis of the world's experience with
SARS.55
Nevertheless, Gostin may be a bit quick in concluding that
communitarianism would necessarily err on the side of granting the
government coercive power in cases when the threat of bioterrorism is
moderate.56 If liberals believe that values and preferences are formed by
individuals, communitarians are apt to stress that value preferences are
determined by and within communities. 57 As a result, communities
determine for themselves the value and priority given both to health and
to particular individual freedoms. Some communities may well place a
high priority on health and security and a low value on individual
autonomy. No doubt it is plausible to posit that health is an essential

52. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1154.
53. Id. at 1154-55; see also DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 58-62
(1993); AMITAI ETzIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MORALITY INA DEMOCRATIC

SOCIETY 244-47 (1996) (arguing that "[l]ife and health are compelling in and of themselves");
Robert Labonte, Health Promotion and the Common Good: Toward a Politics of Practice, in
PROMOTING HEALTHY BEHAVIOR: How MUCH FREEDOM? WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?

95, 108

(Daniel Callahan ed., 2000).
54. ETzIONI, supra note 53, at 39-40; STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SwIFr, LIBERALS AND
COMMUNITARiANS 162-64 (1992); Thomas Moody, Some ComparisonsBetween Liberalismand
an Eccentric Communitarianism,in THE LIBERALiSM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE: LIBERTY

AND COMMUNITY VALUES 91, 91-101 (C.F. Delaney ed., 1994).
55. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Freedom to Infect? SAPS and Common Sense, RESPONSIVE

COMMUNITY, Summer 2003, at 4.
56. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1158.
57. See BELL, supra note 53, at 38; ETZIONI, supra note 53, at 218-23, 257.
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ingredient for the flourishing of most communities. But as Gostin notes,"
a communitarian cannot know that a priori because other
communities-for example, religious communities which forswear
medical treatment-may rely upon a very different set of values.
Indeed, in arguing that communitarians will accept his framework,
Gostin implicitly relies upon a relatively static notion of community, one
in which "the community" is treated not only as a given, but almost as if
it were equivalent to "the state," which is to wield extraordinary powers
in the face of bioterrorism"' But, for communitarians, community itself is
a complex and flexible concept. Individuals do not belong to single
communities. There are communities of worship, communities of identity,
and communities of belief. These communities are "'reference groups'
from which individuals draw an identity, from which they negotiate norms
of conduct."'6 Such communities mediate the relationship their members
have with the state itself.6' However, they need not be the state, and
community norms and notions of the good life cannot be immediately
equated with concepts like national security.62
In addition, many communitarians stress the deliberative process of
self-governance by which communities come to determine and implement
their values. 63 To them, what matters most is not the particular substantive
valuation (the relative value of health to liberty) but the community-wide,
democratic processes by which those values are determined. In this
respect, the MSEHPA and the entire "homeland security project" may be
problematic. Although Gostin notes the importance of a democratic
process, 64 and advocates involving individuals and communities in
66
shielding,65 the process employed in the development of the MSEHPA,
and indeed, the nation's response to September 1 lth, has hardly
exemplified the type of deliberative, bottom-up process that
communitarians advocate. Shielding, as portrayed by Gostin, seems more
58. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1156-57.
59. Gostin does note that the idea of community is not precise. Id.at 1155. However, in
asserting that communitarians would support government actions taken to protect homeland
security, Gostin treats community as if it were equivalent to a political entity. Indeed, at times he
at 1160, leading the reader to question whether
stresses the role of the federal government, see id.
Gostin believes that communitarianism would also support increased power for the federal
government.
60. FRAZER, supra note 12, at 207.
61. Id.
62. Frazer notes the ambiguity within communitarian theory as to whether states can be
communities. Id. at 72.
63. ETZoNI, supra note 53, at 222.

64. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1162-63.
65. Id. at 1166-68.
66. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking
Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF. 79, 88-89 (2002).
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aimed at garnering the cooperation of communities and the acquiescence
of individuals to policies already chosen by others than involving
communities in the determination of values and the development of
responses to problems.67 Moreover, the very concept of delegating
extraordinary powers to "public health experts," and trusting these experts
to revise or suspend all laws, seems at odds with, at least in spirit, the type
of civic deliberation endorsed by communitarians.68
Given their emphasis on community responsibility, communitarians
stress not only the limitation of rights, but the existence of mutual duties.
Yet, under Gostin's formulation, legal responses to bioterrorism would
provide for very little in the way of duties as they are portrayed by
communitarians. First, while he argues that the government must have
power to respond to bioterrorism, the MSEHPA does not impose duties on
the government. Indeed, under the MSEHPA, the government itself is
immune from claims that it failed to secure either the health of the public
or the needs of individuals taken into custody.69 But more importantly,
neither the act nor Gostin's framework provides for mutual duties or civic
engagement. Instead, they divest (as does the entire "homeland security
project") responsibility to relatively remote and often unaccountable
government agents to "take care of the problem." This seems very distinct
from the type of reciprocal obligations between citizens envisioned by
communitarians.
Finally, and importantly, through their critique of liberalism and its
emphasis on rights, communitarians stress the evolution and importance
of communally-enforced extra-legal norms. Amitai Etzioni writes that "for
a society to be communitarian, much of the social conduct must be
'regulated' by reliance on the moral voice rather than on the law, and the
scope of the law itselfmust be limited largely to that which is supported
by the moral voice."7 This suggests that for communitarians, law
itself-at least in its formal, statutory, or adjudicatory incarnation-should
play a relatively small role in our efforts to confront public health threats,
whether they arise from bioterrorism or other sources.7 ' The type of formal
delegation of powers overseen by the construction of legal standards and

67. See Gostin, supra note I, at 1166-68.
68. See, e.g., FRAZER, supra note 12, at 209-17 ("Political communitarians are skeptical
about the power of the state .... Republicanism seeks to build, by means of public participation
and decision, a society in which citizens enjoy the dignity which comes with fully participating in
political decisions about the economic, social, and political structures that will govern them.").
69. MSEHPA, supra note I, § 804.
70. ETZIONI, supra note 53, at 139; see also FRAZER, supra note 12, at 139.
71. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities,30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 653 (1995).
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judicial process envisioned by Gostin appears far more liberal than
communitarian in its design.
None of this is to say that communitarians would disagree with
Gostin's ultimate conclusion that liberty at times needs to be restrained in
the face of public health threats; although communitarians might dissent
from his phrasing of the question in that very liberal, individual versus
community, mode. Many communitarians will concur that public health
is for most communities part and parcel of the common good and that the
state may take coercive measures against individuals and firms in order to
advance that common good. But communitarianism, like liberalism, is a
complex and heterogeneous body of thought that may raise many useful,
and even conflicting questions about our responses to bioterrorism. We
should follow Gostin's lead and continue to probe its different strands and
ponder the questions communitarians raise about our public health laws
and the ways in which we make them.
C. Public Health Perspectives
In his Dunwody lecture, Gostin has used liberal and communitarian
theories to support limited restrictions on individual liberty in the face of
bioterrorist threats. In doing so, Gostin has added useful rigor to our
debates about bioterrorism preparedness and has implicitly challenged us
to assess public health interventions in light of leading moral theories. This
is an important task that we would be wise to heed as we draft and
evaluate legal responses.
There is also, I think, an additional way to view the question. Instead
of applying pre-existing moral or ethical theories to a public health
problem, one can imagine turning the analysis upside down, and asking
what light public health's own perspectives and teachings would shed both
on some questions raised by our moral theories and the more concrete
issue of public health preparedness. Importantly, public health, even more
so than liberalism and communitarianism, is not a singular theory with an
*all-encompassing analysis.72 Nevertheless, one can discern within the field
and its teachings several assumptions and perspectives (none of which
everyone within will share) that distinguish it from liberalism and/or
communitarianism, and that might offer a different vantage point for
assessing policy issues. In this Part, I will attempt to outline broadly three
ways in which public health differs from the predominant chords within
liberalism and communitarianism. In the conclusion, I will try to sketch
what light those differences may shed on the subject of bioterrorism and
the law.

72. Wendy E. Parmet &Anthony Robbins: PublicHealth LiteracyforLawyers, 31 J.L. MED.
& ETIcs (forthcoming 2003).
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Perhaps the most obvious distinction between public health and
liberalism is public health's assertion that the health of a population is an
objective good, measurable by objective criteria (i.e., morbidity, longevity,
etc.), 7 3 and not simply a matter of individual choice and preference. This
assertion is also implicit in Gostin's defense of bioterrorism planning, and
as noted above, distinguishes his perspective from liberals who generally
assume that preferences are subjectively determined.74 Hence, from a
public health perspective, the protection of public health may be seen as
justifying actions that liberals would decry as paternalistic75 and that
economists would condemn as irrational or inefficient from a cost-benefit
analysis perspective.76 The public health perspective may also critique
choices made by particular communities that value practices or activities
more than the health they threaten.
Public health also differs from liberalism in its emphasis on
populations. Indeed, if there is a single characteristic that is descriptive of
public health, it is the focus on populations.77 Of course, utilitarians are
also concerned with the many, but as noted before, they determine what
constitutes the good of many by aggregating individual preferences. Public
health, in contrast to utilitarian liberalism, but in accord with
communitarianism," takes populations as the primary unit of analysis and
concern, and sees the members of populations as being interdependent in
numerous, important ways. Most obviously, public health focuses on the
73. E.g., Barry S. Levy, Creating the Future of Public Health: Values. Vision, and
Leadership, 88 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 188 (1998) (describing the values of public health).
74. In addition, it should be noted that a public health perspective may value the health of a
population even more than particular communities. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Baker, Immunization and
the American Way: 4 Childhood Vaccines, 90 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 199 (2000).
75. Henry Mather, Natural Law and Liberalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 331, 355 (2001) (noting
liberals' distaste of paternalism).
76. To be sure, writers within the liberal tradition, like Norman Daniels, have argued that
health itself is a primary good because of its importance in permitting individuals to exercise other
choices. See generallyNORMAN DANELS, JUST HEALTH CARE ( 985). Utilitarians and neo-classical
economists, however, are far more likely to stress the subjective value that people place upon their
health. And they are far less likely than those writing within a public health tradition to accept the
idea that the health of the group is agood apart from and regardless of the aggregation of individual
preferences.
77. LAWRENCE 0. GOsTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 11-14 (2000).
78. Communitarians, however, treat community as more than a "simple aggregation, as a
population is." See FRAZER, supranote 12, at 68. To communitarians, community implies a sharing
of values and transcendence, id. at 83-85, that is quite absent from the epidemiologists' concept of
population, which imports no metaphysical or normative concept to the group. For epidemiologists,
populations are changing entities designated by research designs. Populations may share values,
or they may contest them, and be characterized by very different attributes; "women born in
Massachusetts in 1980," for example. Thus to public health, populations are necessarily' more
contingent than are communities. See, e.g., ALAN J. SILMAN & GARY J. MACFARLANE,
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 53-54 (2d ed. 2002).
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ways in which individual health is determined by and a function of the
health of a given population. As Gostin clearly shows, when it comes to
communicable diseases, the fate of individuals is often dependent upon the
health of others, and the actions taken or not taken by them and their
government. 79 But contrary to the views of utilitarian libertarians, such as
Epstein, 0 public health demonstrates that interdependencies extend
beyond the realm of communicable diseases and even beyond the realm of
what are commonly understood to be public goods. For example, social
epidemiologists have taught us that an individual's risk of contracting a
particular health condition, like high blood pressure, may be affected more
by the society in which the individual resides than any personal attribute,
such as genes or behavior."' Indeed, most cases of an illness like
hypertension may occur not among the outliers who are at "high risk" for
the disease, but among those individuals who have no discernable risk
factor, other than living in a particular society in which the condition is
highly prevalent.8 2 This certainly casts doubt upon the liberal assumption
that individuals can be free to choose their own levels of risk.
Social epidemiologists also have demonstrated a strong association
between an individual's relative social status and his or her health. 3 Some
epidemiologists contend that the health of a society as a whole is affected
by the degree of inequality within that society." Health also may be
affected by racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination. 5
Importantly, public health studies show that not only are health
outcomes determined at the population level, but that individual choices
and preferences that affect health also are partially determined by social
and environmental factors.8 6 Thus, marketing campaigns may influence
smoking behaviors.8 7 Likewise, individual eating habits, and therefore
weight, appear to be significantly affected by a variety of social factors. 8
79. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1147-48.
80. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 35.

81. GEOFFREY ROSE, THE STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 47-63 (1992).
82. Id. at 48-50.
83. Scott Burrs et al., Integrating Law andSocial Epidemiology, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 510,
512 (2002).
84. See Kim Lochner et al., State-Level Income Inequality and Individual Mortality Risk A
Prospective, Multilevel Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 385, 385 (2001).
85. See Kevin Fiscella et al., Inequality in Quality: Addressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and
Ethnic Disparitiesin Health Care, 283 JAMA 2579, 2579-84 (2000).
86. KAREN GLANz ET AL.,

HEALTH BEHAVIOR AND HEALTH EDUCATION: THEORY,

RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 464 (2d ed. 1997).
87. M.C. Farrelly et al., Youth Tobacco Prevention Mass Media Campaigns: Past, Present,
and Future Directions, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 35, 35-48 (2003); Louise Ann Rohrbach et al.,
Independent Evaluation of the California Tobacco Control Program: Relationships Between
Program Exposure and Outcomes, 1996-1998, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 975, 979-82 (2002).

88. Elizabeth Goodman, Letting the "Gini" Out of the Bottle: Social Causation and the
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These social forces also can operate at the community or population level,
questioning the very notion of framing public health problems as raising
conflicts between individuals and the state. Less obviously, public health's
emphasis on the social construction ofpreferences and behaviors may cast
into doubt the communitarian assertion that groups can determine their
own values via deliberation.
Finally, public health differs markedly from strands of both liberalism
and communitarianism in its reliance on empiricism. Neo-classical
economics, in particular, is a highly formal, deductive construct, that
draws normative conclusions based upon deductions from a model of
human behavior.8 9 Communitarianism, while far less formal, remains
highly normative. Although it is based on a theory of human nature that is
informed by observation,90 communitarianism is ultimately a
moral/political theory, rather than an empirical methodology. Public
health, in contrast, is ultimately an empirical endeavor. 9' To be sure, it
begins, as do all sciences,92 with underlying assumptions and constructs
(the population perspective, for example). But to the extent that it offers
guidance or normative suggestions, it does so based upon observation
(contemporaneous and historical) abetted by statistical analysis (using the
disciplines of biostatistics and epidemiology).93 As a result, public health's
prescriptions are inevitably open to contest and reexamination, a fact that
probably drives the public crazy as public health offers different advice
from year to year (carbohydrates are good for you, they're bad for you).
By noting these observations about public health and its contrast to
liberalism and communitarianism, I do not mean to suggest that all
individuals who think about or do public health work would agree with
each (or any of) the premises outlined above. Clearly they would not.
Moreover, I do not claim that public health provides a comprehensive
Obesity Epidemic, 143 J. PEDIATRICS 228, 228-30 (2003) (editorial).
89. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 1.1-.4 (1998). Recently other
forms of economics with a more empirical proclivity, like behavioral economics, have begun to
influence legal debates. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., New Perspectives and Legal Implications:
Regulationfor Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Casefor 'Asymmetric Paternalism,'
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); David A. Dana, A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and
Human Behavior: A Behavioral Economic Defense ofthe Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1315, 1315 (2003).
90. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT INAMERICAN LIFE ix (1985).
91. See BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC HEALTH: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 19, 33
(1997) ("Public health differs from other systems in one important respect: its outcomes .... For
public health, the bottom line is improved health status in the population.").
92. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCEINTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
93. ANDREW C. HARPER & LAURIE J. LAMBERT, THE HEALTH OF POPULATIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION 5-6 (2d ed. 1994).
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world vision or that its perspectives are ultimately superior to those
provided by either liberalism or communitarianism. Nevertheless, public
health's own insights are worth bringing to bear on the question of how the
state should prepare for bioterrorism.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND BIOTERRORISM
The public health perspectives outlined above do not provide any
definitive analysis of what actions the state ought to take to confront
possibilities of bioterrorism. Nor can these perspectives form the sole
guideposts for legal analysis, which invariably must take into account a
myriad of other considerations, including legal precedent, the norms and
modalities of legal reasoning, and the teachings of moral theories.
Nevertheless, public health's perspective can contribute, I believe, to our
discussion of the issue.
First, to the extent that public health's assertion-that the public's
health is an objective good-is accepted, it helps validate the initiative to
prevent morbidity or mortality from bioterrorism. From a public health
perspective, the value of a population's health is not simply a question of
preferences or cultural deliberation. It is an objective value worthy of
concern, period.94 This means that if bioterrorism is a threat to a
population's health, it is a legitimate target of concern and intervention,
even if the public is not thinking about or caring about it at the moment.
This is a view evident in old case law, but less prevalent today as both
rights theory and utilitarianism in the guise of neo-classical economics
have led judges to question whether health is indeed an important and
legally recognizable value.9
Second, and more importantly, public health's teaching about both the
importance of populations and their interdependencies provides a firm
justification for government to take actions in order to prevent populations
from being harmed by bioterrorism. As Gostin reminds us, bioterrorism is
not something that individuals can protect themselves from (not
withstanding the government's advice last winter to purchase and use duct
tape).9 6 Bioterrorism, like SARS, asthma, and a million and one other
threats, affects populations and can be best addressed at the population

94. Of course, it is just this axiom with which critics, especially neo-classical economists,
are apt to differ.
95. See Richard A. Daynard, Regulating Tobacco: The Needfor a Public Health Judicial
Decision-Making Canon, 30 J.L. MED. &EmIcs 281, 281 (2002); Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights
and Communicable Disease: AIDS, the Police Power, and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 741, 748-62 (1989).
96. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1160; see also Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses:
Precautions; Administration Gives Advice on How to Prepare for a Terrorist Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2003, at A16.
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level. Thus, public health provides a very different and far less skeptical
lens on government action than does either liberalism, or potentially
communitarianism.97
The need and justification for population-based approaches, however,
does not necessarily require or sanction the type of coercive interventions
contemplated by the MSEHPA. For one thing, the very interdependency
of populations that is core to the public health perspective and that justifies
population-based interventions, should cast doubt on framing public health
problems as a contest between individuals and the public. Ironically,
Gostin's discussion of bioterrorism, by focusing on the power of the state
over individuals and the way that power can be limited by legal processes,
actually derives from a liberal perspective that assumes that the good of
the individual exists apart from the good of the population, and the ability
of legal processes to serve as a neutral device, to ensure the impartiality of
decisions harmful to the individual.98 A population perspective, in contrast,
may well question not only whether the individual can be viewed as
having preferences or rights apart from the population, but whether the
focus on limiting those preferences or rights is in fact the best way to
address the problem. Gostin does advocate other population-based
approaches to address bioterrorism, like the retooling of the public health
infrastructure." Still, he remains convinced that when push comes to
shove, it comes to the individual versus the state.
Public health's focus on interdependency may also lead us to ask not
only whether we can limit individual rights, but the degree to which the
application of coercive, and indeed frightening, measures upon individuals
will itself be harmful to public health. Thus, we must care not only about
the "rights" of the individual subject to quarantine or forced vaccination
(as the rights theorist would do), but the impact of those measures on
social solidarity and the ability of a community to confront a threat.'00
Here, there is much reason to believe, as Gostin has written elsewhere, that
coercive measures may actually be corrosive of population health and

97. This is to the extent that communitarianism is understood as stressing reciprocal extralegal relationships, not the formal invocation of state authority. See supra text accompanying notes
70-71.
98. Liberals generally profess a commitment to the rule of law which entails legal recognition
of rights and a separation of law from politics. Legal-process theorists are liberals who especially
value the neutrality of the law and legal processes. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in
Modern American Law: A View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10, 21-34 (1999).
99. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1128-31.
100. See, e.g., Peter A. Gorski, Caring Relationships: An Investment in Health?, 115 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 144, 144-50 (2000); Ichiro Kawachi et al., Long Live Community: Social Capital as
Public Health, 8 AM. PROSPECT 56, 56-57 (1997). George Annas made this precise point in his
criticism of the MSEHPA. See George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Human Rights,
21 HEALTH AFF. 94,94-97 (2002).
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respect for individual dignity, and egalitarian approaches may be more
supportive of public health.' ' Thus, public health itself may come around
to supporting the liberal's concern for human rights and the
communitarian's concern for participation and deliberation, not as goods
in themselves, but because they may help create a community conducive
to health. Certainly, regimes that are repressive and disdainful of human
dignity are not often associated with positive public health outcomes.
Indeed, while the use of surveillance and rapid isolation has been credited
with limiting the spread of SARS, even with that air-borne disease, which
posed the strongest case possible for mandatory isolation, the verdict is
still out as to whether coercive measures themselves did more harm than
good. Certainly there is reason to wonder whether SARS would have
spread as rapidly as it did had it first made its appearance in a more open
and less repressive a society than China.0 2 And we do not know whether
the epidemic in Canada would have spread further or been halted earlier
if that country had a less secure tradition of protecting individual rights
and providing for social welfare. Moreover, the history of past quarantines
pause before one assumes that they actually benefit
certainly should give
03
the public's health.
Importantly, while I have written elsewhere about my worries and
qualms about the MSEHPA, °4 public health's emphasis on empiricism
cautions me to conclude with the observation that we really don't know the
answer to the questions posed. We do not know the risks of bioterrorism;
nor do we know either the risks or benefits of preparing for it, or revising
our laws to provide states additional emergency powers. It may well be
that if a catastrophe arises, the clarification of legal power will prove
useful and a population may be saved. But it is also possible that
emergency powers can be abused, that "code oranges" will prove to be
misguided,0 5 that due process hearings will not provide much protection,
and that more harm than good will come from the displacement of energy

101. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & ZrrA LAZZARINI, HuMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH INTHE
AIDS PANDEMIC 69 (1997).
102. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Health-East Asia: SARS Outbreak Draws Contrasting
Responses, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 4, 2003.
103. Parmet, supra note 50, at 55-71.
104. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, QuarantineRedux: Bioterrorism,AIDS andthe Curtailment
of Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85 (2003).
105. Gostin seems to equate a"code orange" state with the "moderate risk' scenario for which
he thinks we should accept some government limitations. See Gostin, supra note 1,at 1136. On the
problems and confusion associated with the government's declarations of "code orange" and its
efforts to determine and warn the public about threat levels, see Anya Sostek, OrangeCrash: The
Confusion and Cost of Complying with National TerrorAlerts are DrivingCities to Question the
Whole System, GOVERNING, Aug. 2003, at 18.
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and resources from common everyday killers to bioterrorism.'06 Indeed, if
the history of public health law teaches us anything, it is that we need to
be open and skeptical to uncontested claims about what will best promote
the population's health. With that claim, I suspect, neither liberals nor
communitarians would disagree.

106. See Parmet, supra note 104, at I 10-15.
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